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Abstract
Recently, an awareness has been emerging in economics of the fact that important problems are
not solvable algorithmically, that is, by any finite number of steps. This statement can be made
mathematically exact and this paper reviews the contributions that have been made in this regard,
all related to standard topics in economics.
1 Introduction: on the Medieval Horror of Malleus Malefi-
carum
Quite a long time ago, when one of the authors was in school, he was asked to read the infamous late
15th century inquisitorial book Malleus Maleficarum and, beyond the endless gory details of tortures
to be applied to witches, to comment on what he found as by far the most important feature of that
text. As it happened, what he found was the—most surprising—perfect identity in their respective
views, which both the inquisitors and the witches manifestly shared with one another, of the way the
world functions. Shared indeed, and did so of course, without in the very least being aware of that
monumentally important fact.
What they shared was nothing else but their fundamental—and never ever questioned— belief that for
absolutely every problem in life there exists a clear cut and unquestionable solution, and on top of it, that
solution is given by a finite number of equally clear and well defined steps which are to be implemented
in one and only one well specified order. Needless to say, the inquisitors who wrote that book used
various finite sets of strictly theological and legal arguments, plus—of course, and so fashionable at the
time—thoroughly described tortures, each consisting of a finite number of clearly described but horrible
procedures. In their turn, the witches, in a perfectly similar manner, were using a large, and often
hilarious—if not in fact, ridiculous—variety of procedures, each of them consisting of a well defined finite
number of steps, to be executed in one and only one strictly specified order. Witches and inquisitors
were, therefore, united in their respective belief that a formulaic solution to their respective problem
exists. This reminds one of the authors of what he has always held to be the somewhat questionable
guiding philosophy behind extramarital affairs1: if one intimate relationship does not make one happy,
then two will perhaps ensure felicity. So much for an algorithmic view of the ways the world works.
It is worth noting that the algorithmic approach has a long, universal and venerated presence in human
civilization, as manifested in the surprisingly rich variety of rather dramatic actions of both heroes and
villains which populate folk tales—including those for children. The difference between the Malleus and
1As opposed to pure adultery.
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such actions or algorithms, however, is that the authors of all those tales, no matter how ancient, clearly
manifested a meta-algorithmic or trans-algorithmic wisdom. Indeed, in none of those tales is it sufficient
either for the hero or the villain to perform one single, no matter how extraordinary algorithm. On
the contrary, the ever fascinating suspense—with the breath-taking dynamics of its many sudden and
unexpected turns in those tales—comes precisely from the fact that, for a long long time, and just until
the happy end, none of the algorithms performed by the hero seems to suffice for his or her ultimate
success. And certainly, the algorithms of the villains will eventually fail, no matter how diabolical they
may be. It is, therefore, most clearly in that way that the authors of all such tales, including those
for children, teach us a wisdom which completely failed the inquisitors and witches of older times, or
for that matter, so many of the economists or politicians of our days. . . It is thus remarkable that even
children’s stories turn out to know much better than such algorithm-bound personages as the inquisitors
and witches of Malleus Maleficarum. But how about the practitioners of much of present day economics,
or for that matter, politics? Do we indeed witness, as we have done throughout long ages, an ongoing
massive regression of any number of adults to infancy ? The 8 year old son of one of the authors often
comes up with jokes he himself invents. A recent one is the following :
How do extra-terrestrials call our human children ? Answer : juvenile humanoids. And how
do extra-terrestrials call our adult humans ? Answer : extreme juvenile humanoids ...
2 The Dismal Applied Science
Mathematical economics is undeniably a beautiful theory with considerable epistemic value. Recall,
however, that it was also a most practical thing when American soldiers were told to deliver food and
other goods to the island of Vanuatu during World War II.However, is it a good thing that islanders today
worship a deity called John Frum (“John from Illinios/Kansas/Texas”) who is supposed to return one
day with salvation and... more cargo? Economics is not the only science blighted by insistent application
of simplistic, if not in fact, atavistic medieval views. Statistics, among other sciences, is often equally
damned. The government of South Africa takes comfort, for example, in the finding of a recent report
[14], regarding possible perverse incentives in the Child Support Grant, or CSG, according to which
the quantitative analysis suggests that the take-up rate of the CSG by teenage mothers
remains low. Teenagers, that is, younger than 20 years, represent 5% of all CSG recipients
registered at October 2005.
The report concludes, apparently largely on the basis of this single statistic2, that there is no perverse
incentive in the grant. The consideration that teenage mothers are sooner or later mothers of 30 with a
14 year old child, still receiving the grant, is absent. Buried in the same report, one will read that
the proportion of mothers who were teenagers at the birth—not necessary at the application
for CSG—of their eldest child to be registered on SOCPEN from 2000–2004, increased from
23% in 2000 to 32% in 2004.
This telling figure appears not to have influenced the conclusions of the report. And unless the minister
for Social Development has read it very carefully, he will now sleep soundly at night. The activists who
are proposing extending the payment of the grant until age 18—thereby creating an enabling, if not
in fact, encouraging environment for two successive generations of one family to simultaneously receive
it—will also be encouraged by the Department of Social Development’s conclusion rather than by the
facts. Will our descendants look upon a social policy that actively promoted and rewarded a quarter of
a million teenage pregnancies per annum in a medium-sized country with the same horror with which
we regard the Malleus?
Mathematical economics still contributes much to the way that we see the world. Take the fashionable
business of carbon emissions trading as an example. Carbon emission caps, and the tradability of the
gap between an enterprise’s actual emissions and its cap, have created a new asset class, called carbon
accounting units, the market in which might be expected to approach a Walrasian equilibrium. By
neoclassical economics we know that a equilibrium price exists, but we do not necessarily know whether
there is a single equilibrium or many equilibria—nor whether there are any stable equilibria. Furthermore,
2This is what the great physicist Richard Feynman has called [15] cargo cult science.
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there is no reason to believe that we can be more sure whether carbon trading units will be cheap or
expensive next year, than we can be sure about the price of pork bellies in Chicago. It is rather
amusing that individuals in favour of carbon caps (and trading in these new commodities) are sometimes
stridently against so-called speculators and other investors. For some people carbon credits are clearly
already very affordable, allowing Mr Albert Gore—for example—to effortlessly be a green prophet with
a heated swimming pool.
Carbon trading can be better understood through a quotidian analogy: consider the possibility of
trading highway speeding. A person could earn speed credits by driving, say, at 90km/h from Pretoria
to Durban, and then sell these on the market—for example, to two people who want to each drive at
an average of 135km/h from Durban to Pretoria. Monitoring will be necessary, but there will be a good
incentive to drive slower than the speed limit of 120km/h. And there will be no need for speeding tickets,
although, obviously, strict but non-violent monitoring of the road network will be required. The market
will simply establish a price for speeding that matches supply and demand. This should at least be
an improvement over the incorrect pricing observed so spectacularly in a study [13] of fines at Israeli
day-care centers.
The existence proofs of mathematical economics have imbued theoretical economics with a semblence
of the supposed rigid veracity of physics. The belief, erroneous in the minds of the authors, that the
world in which we live is identical with an appropriate (nay, existing) model in physics has—in some
places—also spread to economics. Without impugning the achievements of mathematical economics, this
papers attemps to highlight some recent results—inspired by similar questions asked in mathematics—
that reflect on the limits of the practical applications of the theory.
The founders of modern economics were well aware of problems related to the tractability of the math-
ematical models that they developed. Vilfredo Pareto has pointed out in his 1927 Manuel d’e´conomie
politique that the equations for a real economy would be so many as to be impossibly complex to solve.
Of course he did not have computers in mind but it turns out that his intuition about this absolutely
correct, as we shall explain later. In 1945 Friedrich Hayek remarked:
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by
the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in
concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.
Hayek’s comments can be interpreted to refer to availability of data only if one thinks of the “dispersed
bits” that he refers to as in geographic dispersion. However, if one takes it to say simply that the necessary
information or results cannot be succinctly described then his remark echoes the non-computability
results of Richter and Wong which we briefly review below.
3 Enter Modern Economics
The need for a formal definition of algorithm or computation became clear to the scientific community
of the early twentieth century due mainly to two problems posed by David Hilbert:
• the Entscheidungsproblem—can an algorithm be found that, given a statement in first-order logic
(for example Peano arithmetic), determines whether it is true in all models of a theory; and
• Hilbert’s tenth problem—does there exist an algorithm which, given a Diophantine equation, de-
termines whether is has any integer solutions?
The Entscheidungsproblem, or decision problem, can be traced back in some form at least to Leibniz and
was successfully and independently resolved in the negative during the mid-1930s by Alonzo Church and
Alan Turing. Unless it is indicated or directly implied otherwise, “computation’ and “compute” in the
paper will refer to the action of and functions computed by an appropriate Turing machine. The notion
of formal computability enters economics in two very obvious ways.
• The computability of model outcomes: any practical applications would clearly require that the
result be computable, i.e. that it could—even just in principle, because computers improve over
time—be produced by a computer.
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• As a limit on the actions of the agents: instead of allowing arbitrary preferences or utility functions,
one could—reasonably—want to restrict the theory to computable objects, for example computable
preferences on computable bundles of goods. A computable preference is simply one which can
be calculated in a finite amount of time using a machine with a finite amount of resources and
a computable bundle would be any bundle that can be coherently represented using only a finite
number of symbols.
If it is assumed that the economic agents are anything like real human beings then it makes perfect sense
for all the objects in the theory to be taken to be computable. For example, computable prices are the
only prices that one can conceivable use in an MS-Excel3 or Gnumeric4 spreadsheet.
3.1 Computability in equilibrium theory
The general equilibrium theorem of Kenneth Arrow and Ge´rard Debreu, establishing the existence of a
competitive equilibrium in an economy with a finite number of consumers and a finite number of goods,
is proved using the Brouwer fixed-point theorem (BFPT). BFPT is of course also used in game theory
and other areas of economics. In this section I denotes the standard unit interval [0, 1] of real numbers.
Theorem 1 (Brouwer) Any continuous function f : I2 → I2 has a fixed point, i.e. there exists an
x ∈ I2 such that f(x) = x.
The fact is that the BFPT is very non-constructive. In fact, there are functions f for which the fixed
points themselves are all non-constructive when viewed as solitary objects. Given a function f , we do
might not only not know how to find the fixed point x such that
f(x) = x
but it can also be a point which cannot be defined in an effective way at all. By this we mean that there
exist functions f for which there exists no algorithm (using finite resources, e.g. a Turing machine) that
can approximate any fixed point of f , given a margin of error ε, up to the given margin of error.
The exact definitions of computable real numbers and of computable functions on the natural numbers
appear in Alan Turing’s pioneering work of the 1930s. A computable function from the natural numbers
(N0) to the natural numbers is a function that can be computed in principle by a Turing machine (which,
for the purposes of this paper, the reader can assume to be a desktop computer with infinite memory).
A computable real number is any number which can in principle be approximated by a Turing machine.
Definition 1 A real number x is called computable if there exist computable functions φx1 , φ
x
2 , φ
x
3 : N0 →
N0 such that for all k ∈ N0 ∣∣∣∣ x− (−1)φx1 (k)φx2(k)φx3(k)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−k.
The approriate definition of computability for a real-valued function of real variables is beyond the
scope of this paper and the reader is referred to the paper of Brattka [8], for example. In this paper, a
computable real function f will be represented as a Turing-computable function that maps descriptions
of computable reals x to descriptions of the computable reals f(x). That is, f is called computable if
there exists a computer program that transforms an approximation procedure for x to an approximation
procedure for f(x). This is a rather natural notation but the observant reader will remark that—as
there are only countably many computable reals—such an f need not necessarily be defined outside a
set of measure zero. Nevertheless, all of the continuous functions usually used in economics courses are
computable in this sense. These functions are often called computably coded.
The computable counterexample to the Brouwer theorem is due to Orevkov [23] (cited i.a. in [17])
who worked in the Russian school of constructivism. Baigger [1] rewrote the Orevkov construction to
define a computable function on I2 which has no computable fixed point. A similar construction was
described by Richter and Wong [30] in their paper that established the following
Theorem 2 (Richter and Wong [30, 29]) For any ` ≥ 3 there exists a computable economy E with
a finite number of agents and with ` goods for which no computable equilibrium exists.
3The authors are not affiliated with Microsoft Corporation but would not reject donations or grants from Microsoft.
4Even Linux is limited by the theory of formal computability.
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This theorem is a direct application of the Orevkov counter example and therefore says not only that
the equilibrium cannot be found but also that the equilibrium price vector is an uncomputable one. The
non-computability of the price vector implies not only that it cannot be found, but that it has no finite
description in any formal computing scheme.
One can consider the situation where some additional information about the equilibria of an exchange
economy are known, for example If f is a computable coded function with computable modulus of uniform
continuity mapping computable points in I2 to computable points in I2 then f can be extended to a
total function f∗(x) : I2 → I2 and the following version of the BFPT can be obtained.
Theorem 3 (Hirst [17]) If f∗ has finitely many fixed points, then f has a computable fixed point.
This result, together with Debreu’s proof [11] that regular economies have finitely equilibria, appears to
allow one to salvage a computable general equilibrium theorem. Certainly, if f∗ has one fixed point then
there appears to be a procedure for finding it. However, if f∗ has more than one, but still finitely many
fixed points, then the proof only infers the existence of a fixed point which is a computable real number,
but in a non-constructive way. That is, it proves the existence of a computable x such that
f∗(x) = x
but we still have no indication of how to find it.
3.2 Computability in individual choice
In a recent interview5, 2002 Nobel laureate Vernon L Smith—asked which economists had influenced
him most—replied:
At Harvard, Wassily Leontief, who had a certain amount of skepticism about economics and
a great sense of humor. After two weeks of studying utility theory, student raised his hand
and asked, “Professor, what is utility good for?” Leontief responded “It’s good for teaching.”
It would nevertheless obviously be nice of computable (in some sense) preferences should give rise to
computable utility functions. The following theorems appeared to establish that this is the case.
Theorem 4 (Richter and Wong [31, 29]) If  ⊆ `+×R`+ is a computable preference relation, then
there exists a computable function u : R`+ → R`+ that rationalizes .
However, Richard and Wong seem to have defined a computable preference relation through the charac-
teristic function. This is in fact a bad definition since all computable functions are continuous and hence
sets with computable characteristic functions are both open and closed (clopen). In Euclidean space
however the only clopen sets are the empty set and the entire space. The preceding result (although
correctly derived) appears to contradict an earlier result of Bridges and Richman [9] but only because of
this specific use of the definition of a computable preference relation. The result of Bridges and Richman
did in fact establish that a computable preference relation can give rise to an non-computable utility
function.
3.3 Computability in social choice
The final remark concern Fishburn’s treatment of the Arrow impossibility theorem.
Theorem 5 (Arrow) If a decision-making body has at least two (but finitely many) members and at
least three (but finitely many) options to decide among, then it is impossible to design a universal (it
should create a deterministic, complete societal preference order from every set of individual preferences),
non-imposing (every societal preference should be achievable) social choice function that satisfies all of
the following three conditions.
• non-dictatorship;
• unanimity (if all individuals prefer x to y then so does the society); and
5With Russ Roberts, http://www.econtalk.org/archives/2007/05/vernon_smith_on.html#highlights (accessed
2007-05-23).
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• independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Peter Fishburn, recipient of the 1996 INFORMS von Neumann Theory Prize, showed in 1970 [12] that
the three conditions in Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem can in fact be satisfied by a social choice function
if there are infinitely many decision makers. H. Reiju Mihara has however proved that Arrow’s Theorem
does in fact still hold for the case of a countably) infinite society if all coalitions are required to be
computable and we require a pairwise-computable social welfare function [19]. In this case computability
seems a highly reasonable requirement as it simply means that, for example, one can in practice identify
the coalitions and that any two different options can be ranked in practice.
4 The historical background in relation to Game Theory
Let us review more significant moments in the vagaries of the reflex type and never questioned total
belief in the algorithmic approach to a variety of human problems, as they manifested themselves in
more recent times. Algorithms are of course supposed to solve appropriate classes of problems. Many
of such problems, not seldom the more critical ones, may involve optimisation. And when the interests
of several parties are at play, as happens in human society, they can typically lead to the need for
conflict resolution. No wonder, therefore, that in Economics, as well as in a variety of other fields
of applicative importance there has been a significant interest in the development of whole ranges of
rigorous methods, that is algorithms, for dealing with such situations. Several such modern fields, as
well as their interconnections are reviewed in [25]. A significant and major confluence and interaction
between Economics and Game Theory happened to come about during WW II, with the publication by
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern of their massive and influential book Theory of Games and
Economic Behaviour, Princeton University Press, 1944.
Now, after more than six decades, it may be worth recalling a few features of the respective relevant
background. The first major result in Game Theory was obtained by von Neumann at the age of 25, in
1928, when he solved the two person zero sum game, which of course is the simplest possible nontrivial
game. As it happened, Borel, a French mathematician of high standing at the time, studied games
not long earlier. However, he did not manage to obtain that fundamental result, and in fact, proposed
a related conjecture which later proved to be wrong. The remarkable fact about von Neumann being
involved at the time in Game Theory is that during the same period he contributed fundamental results
to the axiomatisation of Set Theory and also set up the first rigorous mathematical treatment based
on Hilbert space operators of the just emerging modern Quantum Mechanics. In this regard, one may
wonder whether his dealing with games at the time was no more than a mere active form of relaxation,
given what would appear to be the incomparably higher importance of the other two subjects he was
involved in.
A proper answer to that question requires a better look at von Neumann’s biography. Born in 1903
into a wealthy and privileged family in Budapest, he grew up, until 1914 when WW I erupted, in a
glorious period not only of his own country, the Austro-Hungarian empire, but of much of the rest of
Europe as well. Indeed, after WW I, Europe would not reach a comparable state of prosperity, freedom
or security for another seven or eight decades, and then do so mainly due to the European Union. Soon
after WW I erupted, life changed dramatically for the worse all over Europe, and did so no matter how
privileged one had earlier been. Added to that came the ongoing misery, not only economic and social,
but also political, which for many years would engulf inter-war Europe. All that dramatic, sudden and
unexpected change became the life experience of von Neumann—starting from his early teenage years. A
similar experience was to be the fate of the well known philosopher Karl Popper, born in 1902 in Vienna,
who came from a comparably privileged family. Consequently, von Neumann and Popper became two
of the most active and representative members of their European generation who wanted not only to
understand how such a catastrophe like WW I could happen in civilized Europe, but also how possibly
to prevent it from ever happening again.
Popper’s answer led him to his development of the concept of Open Society, while von Neumann
turned, among other things, to Game Theory. In von Neumann’s view Game Theory would for the first
time in human affairs offer a systematic scientific approach to conflict management between rational and
civilised parties. And indeed, the ultimate horror of WW I appeared to von Neumann, Popper and other
thinkers of their generation as coming precisely from the fact that the European political class which
had been responsible for it had been constituted from people coming from some of the most privileged
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old families, people whom quite likely more than any other ones, one could assume to be civilised and
rational. It is not, therefore, so surprising that in 1928, while fully involved in foundational issues of
Set Theory and Quantum Mechanics, von Neumann consecrated time and effort to the solution of the
two person zero sum game. And during the next decade and half, until the publication of that first ever
and massive treaties on The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, von Neumann considered it so
important to further pursue significant research in Game Theory. And he did so while at the same time
he happened to be involved in a considerable number of other crucially important projects, such as the
theoretical development and effective building of the first electronic computer, the Los Alamos project
related to the atom bomb, a variety of urgently needed applications of mathematics required by the
American military during WW II, and endless advisory work on highest level government committees.
In this way, the most special importance and priority von Neumann attributed to Game Theory
during those decades becomes particularly clear. With the end of WW II, however, von Neumann’s view
of Game Theory did not change. Indeed, barely one year later, starting with 1946, the world had to
face what would come to be known as the Cold War. And in that newly emerged, and what at the time
appeared most likely a long lasting and dangerous conflict, many influential people besides von Neumann
would see a crucial role played by Game Theory in both tactical and strategic thinking. The leaders of
the Soviet Union, the Cold War enemy of the West, were of course much unlike the old European political
class which had led to WW I. However, one could still rely on their rationality in view of the following
two facts. Their by far highest priority was to secure the outcome of their Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
At the same time, they were fully aware of the highly fragile, thus significantly insecure state of their
empire. Consequently, they were tremendously risk averse, and thus not at all prone to adventurism.
That was the period when the famous think tank at Rand Corporation would invest considerable effort
in a large range of applications of Game Theory, while at places like Princeton the work on furthering
and deepening the theoretical basis of Game Theory appeared as one of the most crucial contributions
to the salvation of human civilization.
It was in this atmosphere, so compellingly described by Sylvia Nasar in her book A Beautiful Mind
[21], that young stars like John Nash emerged with major new contributions to Game Theory. And
that theory appeared at the time to go on and on, from strength to strength. . . As it happened, and as
viewed by von Neumann and the others involved in it, the strength, and thus value of Game Theory
was precisely in the fact that it could deliver rigorous algorithmic ways for solving large varieties of
conflicts between rational agents. Strangely enough, and quite likely out of wishful thinking, no one
seemed to be concerned about the possible limitations of such an algorithmic approach. On the contrary,
the perception kept persisting that those games which were still without solutions would sooner or later
find one, given enough time for the development of Game Theory. Such a view was indeed strange, and
should have been found to be like that ever since Turing’s Halting Problem of the late 1930s showed so
clearly the limits of the algorithmic approach. Needless to say, the earlier, 1931 Incompleteness results
of Go¨del should have already rang the warning bells in this regard. Also, there were results in Pure
Mathematics itself, such as the impossibility of algorithmic solution of the Word Problem in semigroups,
or later in groups, which were pointing in the same direction. Yet none of these seemed to register at
the time with the Game Theory community.
A major turning point, nearer to the concerns of Game Theory, yet again far from being recognized
as such at the time, came in 1951, with Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Kenneth J Arrow was interested
in Social Choice Theory and came across the fact that, under rather general, natural and minimal
conditions, individual choices cannot be aggregated into a social choice, unless such an aggregation is
done by a dictator. The importance of that most shocking negative result was immediately recognized
and Arrow would be given the Nobel Prize in 1972. However, its deeper and wider meanings were not.
And indeed, how could anyone in a genuinely democratic society like that of America venture unbiased
and freely into the exploration of the possible deeper consequences of that impossibility involving, as it
did, nothing less than a dictator?
And yet, one obvious implication of Arrow’s result, one that would by no means constitute a chal-
lenge to democracy, was that it again pointed so sharply and clearly, and in a context of significant
social importance, to the inevitable limitations inherent in any algorithmic approach. Certainly, the
aggregation, which Arrow proved not to exist, constituted nothing but yet another algorithm. And no
matter how reasonable and mild the respective requirements, such an algorithm would simply not exist.
As it happened at the time, the message of Arrow’s result remained confined to Social Choice Theory.
Consequently, it would not reach the Game Theory community which for a while longer would still be
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fascinated by the algorithmic approach.
A further indication of the long ongoing fascination Game Theory has held, a fascination which
could, and to a certain extent, would cloud its more proper perception and assessment, is the following
fact related to the contributions Nash made to it in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As widely known
among specialists, and also stated more recently in [20], the systematic distinction between cooperative
and non-cooperative games was introduced by Nash. Furthermore, what is considered to be his major
contribution to Game Theory, and earned him the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics, is the so called Nash
Equilibrium Theorem in non-cooperative games. However, as a rather simple analysis shows [26], the
very concept of equilibrium which Nash uses in order to prove its existence by his celebrated theorem
does in fact rely on a particularly strong cooperative assumption, even if that cooperation is by an overall
tacit agreement of the players not to rock the boat too much, rather than by doing certain specific things.
Strangely enough, no one seems to have noted that fact so far. Instead, the Nash Equilibrium
Theorem is considered as the fundamental result in Non-cooperative Game Theory, and as such, the
true generalization to n > 2 players of the 1928 solution of von Neumann to the two person zero sum
game. Needless to say, economists have ever since its formulation nearly six decades ago embraced that
Equilibrium Theorem as a fundamental and normative paradigm in non-cooperation, as illustrated by
the Nobel prize Nash was given for it. Such a saga should, however, not surprise anybody unduly. After
all, it is but one instance among not a few others in which. . . science is not done scientifically. In case
one may be interested in other more recent and by no means less important such instance, it suffices to
read the recent book by the physicist Lee Smolin, entitled The Trouble with Physics [28].
In 1968 William F Lucas described a game with 10 players which had no solution [18]. That result
was certainly quite shocking for anybody strongly committed to the algorithmic view of the world. And
yet, it would take about three more decades until Binmore, [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], would prove the fact that, rather
typically, games do not have solutions ... Following that negative result by Lucas, even if rather tacitly,
the views on Game Theory changed significantly. There would hardly at all be further major conceptual
or theoretical developments, except perhaps for the introduction of the so called oceanic games, in which
there are infinitely many, and in fact, a continuum of players.
By the 1980s, a certain revival of interest in Game Theory would occur. However, it would no longer
be expected to save civilization, and instead, it would merely be one of the many tools used in Economics,
[24]. A somewhat unexpected turn away from the earlier highly regarded Game Theory towards distinctly
practical concerns happened gradually in the 1960s and 1970s, when Multiple Criteria Decision Making,
or in short MCDM, came to the fore. That clearly corresponded to the pressing day to day needs of
a large variety executives in management who were supposed simultaneously to optimize several rather
conflicting criteria or objectives. There had obviously been much earlier many such situations, but
they had been dealt with on a case to case basis, with the specifics of the decision situation and the
idiosyncrasies of the decision makers having mostly determined the outcomes. However, a clear enough
awareness about the existence of a more general pattern, and hopefully, principles and solution methods
as well, had been lacking. Typically, in the presence of multiple criteria one would use a priority based
method, or one would simply attach weights to the criteria, and thus reduce their multiplicity to a single
one.
One of the cases which helped turn the attention to the usefulness of a more systematic and general
approach was the designing in the late 1950s of the Phantom fighter-bomber American jet. In that
instance, those involved in the design soon understood that the issue was not so much about technology
or cost, but how to reconcile the following critically important no less than five parameters of the plane
: minimum weight and size in order to make it highly maneuverable, maximum engine power, fuel tanks
and payload carrying weapons and ammunition. What was noted clearly, was that MCDM problems
were not quite problems of Game Theory, although they involved rather tough conflicts. Indeed, the
executives which faced MCDM problems, either as individuals, or as members of a small group, were
not playing one against the other. That fact, which was even more clear in the case of a single executive
having to deal with an MCDM problem did in fact bring with it a significant advantage, compared with
games, when it comes to finding solutions.
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5 Conclusion
The intention of the preceding remarks is not to deny that, for example, markets function in practice.
Indeed. prominent skeptics of equilibrium theory like experimental economist Vernon Smith [27] have
shown how, in many instances, a kind of stability does emerge in simulated transactional environments.
Words in Hayek’s famous 1945 paper [16], already referred to above, remain appropriate.
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to
changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the
ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who
know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet
them.
The question arises why an awareness of the futility of always and exclusively relying on algorithmic
solutions is still so much missing in management, not to mention the executive and legislative branches
of government, and in general, in politics as such.
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